We study the dynamics of good-by-good real exchange rates using a micro-panel of 270 goods prices across 90 international cities and 13 cities within the U.S., annually from 1990 to 2000. The picture of relative price adjustment that emerges from our analysis is that price adjustment is very rapid both across cities within countries and across cities of the world. In terms of persistence of Law-of-One-Price deviations, national borders appear not to matter. What national borders do matter for are the magnitudes of the long run deviations from the Law-of-One-Price. Across U.S. cities the deviations are economically small while across international cities the deviations are economically large.
Introduction
We study the time series and cross-sectional behavior of 270 goods prices across 90 international and 13 U.S. cities annually from 1990 to 2000. Our goal is to use this novel data source to shed light on the Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle, which Kenneth Rogo¤ (1996) describes as follows.
"How can one reconcile the enormous short-term variability of real exchange rates with the extremely slow rate at which shocks appear to damp out? Most explanations for short-term exchange rate volatility point to …nancial factors such as changes in portfolio preferences, short-term asset price bubbles, and monetary shocks (see, for example, Maurice Obsfteld and Rogo¤ (1998 Rogo¤ ( , 2000 . Such shocks can have substantial e¤ects on the real economy in the presence of sticky nominal wages and prices. Consensus estimates for the rate at which PPP deviations damp, however, suggest a half-life of three to …ve years, seemingly far too long to be explained by nominal rigidities. It is not di¢cult to rationalize slow adjustment if real shocks -shocks to tastes and technology -are predominant. But existing models based on real shocks cannot account for the short-term exchange rate volatility." Rogo¤ (JEL, June 1996, pp. 647-48 .)
The main thesis of this paper is that the half-lives estimated in the existing empirical literature confound two distinct properties of relative prices across locations. At any point in time the price di¤erential of a particular good across locations must be a combination of a transitory deviation and a permanent price di¤erence. An example of a transitory deviation in prices across locations is one arising from a temporary disturbance that shifts supply or demand in either location from its steady state level. Examples of sources of permanent price di¤erences at the retail level may include transportation costs, di¤erences in sales taxes across locations or di¤erences in the costs of non-traded inputs across locations. All of these factors work to prevent arbitrage from driving relative prices toward the Law-of-One-Price prediction in the long run. Because data limitations have presented formidable barriers to investigations of the behavior of absolute prices -as opposed to price indices -these two properties of prices have been impossible to distinguish in much of the existing literature. In contrast, our study uses absolute price data at the level of individual retail goods and services enabling us to estimate the long-run levels of price di¤erences and the rate at which prices converge back to these levels once a disturbance hits a particular market.
We examine the dynamics of relative prices under two common views about their long run means. We describe these alternative views as absolute and conditional price convergence. Absolute convergence implies that in the long run the prices of all goods, across all locations, obey the Law-of-One-Price. Conditional convergence implies that in the long run prices converge to a stationary distribution, with each point in that distribution representing the price of a good in a particular city relative to the average price of that good across all cities. Implicit in these de…nitions is the assumption that relative prices across locations are stationary regardless of the levels of their long-run means.
Employing these alternative assumptions about the long-run turns out to have dramatic implications for the estimated speed of price adjustment. We …nd:
² absolute price convergence is slow (under the null that it occurs at all) both within and across countries; half-lives average 5.4 years across international cities and 3.3 years across U.S. cities.
² conditional price convergence is rapid, with half-lives averaging between 9-10 months across international cities and between 9-13 months across U.S. cities.
² the unit root null is rejected for virtually all goods in the international data and is rejected for almost all goods within the United States.
² the null of absolute price convergence is rejected for most international micro-prices, but not rejected for about half of the goods for intranational relative prices (relative prices across locations within the United States).
Thus, the primary feature of relative price behavior that distinguishes locations within countries from those we observe internationally is not the persistence of the stochastic ‡uc-tuations of relative prices around their long run means, but the magnitude of the long run deviations themselves. The relative price of a typical good between New York City and Los Angeles adjusts about as quickly to a disturbance as the relative price of a typical good between New York and Madrid; the di¤erence is that the long run di¤erential is close to zero for most goods in the former case, but very substantial for most goods in the latter case.
Our work is mainly focused on assessing estimates of half-lives of international price di¤erences, which Rogo¤ (1996) places at between 3 and 5 years after surveying the vast literature on the topic. Less closely related, but also relevant, is an emerging literature that studies the cross-sectional and time series properties of deviations from the Law-ofOne-Price at the retail level. Many of these studies utilize individual goods or subsets of the consumption basket. Examples include Cumby (1996) who studies Big Mac hamburgers, Froot, Kim and Rogo¤ (1995) who study wheat, butter and charcoal, Ghosh and Wolf (1994) who study the Economist Magazine, Haskel and Wolf (1998) who study IKEA furniture, and Lutz (2001) who studies dispersion in automobile prices across European countries.
1 One robust …nding in these papers is that Law-of-One-Price deviations often exceed what is reasonable to attribute to transportation costs and the deviations di¤er signi…cantly across goods even within fairly narrow commodity groupings.
One limitation of these data sources for the purposes of our work is they are limited in either the number of goods available for examination or in the number of locations the price survey is conducted. Having a large number of goods is important to avoid having the results depend on price dynamics in a particular sector. For example, while Cumy (1996) has found price convergence in Big Mac hamburgers to be quite rapid, it is di¢cult to know if these generalizes to other goods in the consumption basket. Studies with a limited set of locations make it di¢cult to obtain reliable inferences because researchers are unable to exploit asymptotic properties of the estimators in the cross-sectional dimension (the time samples are almost uniformly short).
The intranational part of our analysis is most closely related to work by Parsley and Wei (1996) and Cecchetti, Mark and Sonora (1999) . Parsley and Wei utilize the ACCRA price survey and study the dynamics of 51 retail prices across 48 U.S. cities quarterly from 1975 to 1994. They …nd less rapid convergence rates than we do ranging from 45 months quarters for services to 12 to 15 months for goods in terms of the half-lives. Importantly, though, despite using di¤erent goods, a di¤erent frequency and a somewhat di¤erent methodology (bilateral relative prices as opposed to normalizing to the U.S. average price), the half-lives are much lower than observed internationally, consistent with our …ndings. Cecchetti, Mark and Sonora utilize an almost century long panel of U.S. CPI data for major cities and …nd half-lives of real exchange rates on the order of 8 to 10 years. While these half-lives are implausible from the point of view of sluggish nominal price adjustment, they do indicate that the half-lives of 3.3 years for the U.S. under absolute price convergence are not at the high end of estimates existing in the literature. A third study which uses a similar methodology and data is Rogers (2001) ; he focuses on European countries and …nds quite rapid and dramatic price convergence from 1990 to 2000. Debreu (1959) includes the location as one of the dimensions along which a commodity-space is de…ned. What most economists have in mind when thinking of location in terms of prices is the transportation cost of moving the good from one location to another. Thus traded prices are -in the absence of tari¤s and other o¢cial barriers to trade -typically assumed to satisfy the Law-of-One-Price up to a transportation cost. Because this study utilizes retail prices, there is another aspect of location that needs to be considered. An important di¤erence between a bottle of beer consumed at a home and a bottle of beer consumed at a restaurant is that the "rental cost" of providing the space for consumption is counted in the housing part of the consumer price index in the former case and in the price of a bottle of beer away from home in the latter case. One would expect that the deviation from the Law-of-One-Price to be bound by transportation costs and taxes in the case of home consumption but not in the case of consumption away from home (unless rental costs happen to be equal across locations). Moreover, the rental costs often embody something about the location of consumption that make the beer at home and away from home di¤erent "goods" in Debreu's terminology. In this section we develop a simple model of price determination that recognizes some of these features of retail markets.
Theory

A Model of Retail Price Determination
Formally, we begin with the cost minimization problem of the …rm. Here a …rm is a retail outlet that is assumed to sell a single good in a single location. Managers of retail outlets take the prices of inputs as given. Inputs include both non-traded and traded goods and/or services. Non-traded inputs are locally provided while traded inputs are either exported or imported.
The cost function for the individual retail …rm is the solution to the following minimization problem solved at each date:
where C j it is the cost of producing good j in city i at time t. w it is the wage in city i and P k it is the price of traded intermediate input k in location i at time t. It is natural to think of retailers paying for non-traded inputs beyond labor services (e.g., retail space, utilities, advertising, among others), but the wage cost will su¢ce for expositional purposes.
The distinction between non-traded and traded inputs serves two purposes. First, as implicit in the indexing we have adopted two standard assumptions. The …rst is that factor mobility is much higher across sectors within a location than across locations -w it is locationspeci…c, not good-speci…c. The second assumption is that retailers in all locations produce good j using the same production technology -® j and µ j k are good-speci…c, not locationspeci…c.
Under constant returns to scale, the cost function will take the form: Y t ¢ C(P t ; 1) where Y t is the desired real output level and C(P t ; 1) is the unit cost function, the object of interest. We allow the retailer to set a -possibly time-varying -markup over marginal cost, b j it¸1 , so the per unit retail price of good j faced by a consumer located in country i, P j it , is:
Taking logarithms of (2.3) and subtracting an analogous expression for the geometric average price of the same good across all locations (we use q j it to denote the relative price of good j in location i relative to the geometric average price of the same good across all locations: ln(e it P j it =P j t ) gives us an expression for the Law-of-One-Price deviation of good j in location i relative to its geometric mean across all locations (all locations means all international cities or all U.S. cities in what follows)
Absolute and Conditional Price Convergence
The data needed to implement the retail model is well beyond that currently available. We have the retail prices that appear on the left-hand-side of (2.3) but we lack much of what is described on the right-hand-side of that equation. Our approach is to cast the major implications of the model for international and intranational retail price behavior across locations and time based on very mild restrictions governing the evolution of the variables that are predicted to determine the retail price. Toward this end, we formally de…ne conditional and absolute international price convergence using the notation and structure of the model. In what follows we assume the markup, relative wage and relative prices are traded goods are all stationary stochastic processes. We denote the steady-state values of relative markups and prices as:
.q K i g; these objects are the theoretical population means of the time series observations or equivalently the level each economic variable are assumed to reach asymptotically if current and all future disturbances were set to zero. and time-invariant parameters f® j ; µ 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢µ k g constitute a su¢cient information set to determine the retail price q j it at any point in time. This follows directly from equation (2.4) . De…nition 1. Absolute price convergence. International prices are said to obey absolute convergence if, in the absence of disturbances that alter markups and input prices over time, the distribution of real exchange rates F (q j it ) converges asymptotically to a degenerate distribution at the point q j i = 0 8i; j.
Remark 2. A set of su¢cient conditions for absolute convergence in the non-stochastic steady-state are the following:
The …rst constraint is that the markup of price over marginal cost for each good be the same across locations. The second constraint is wage convergence across locations. The last constraint is the convergence of traded good's prices to the Law-of-One-Price across all locations.
Remark 3. The conditions for absolute price convergence may be relaxed by considering the following cases. Case 1: the total cost of intermediate inputs is the same across locations:
The convergence of this sum might be plausible considering that q
Averaging over a su¢ciently large set of traded intermediate inputs would drive this number toward zero. Case 2: If relative markups and relative wages were negatively correlated in the cross-section, the …rst and second term in equation (2.4) will tend to average to zero. The negative correlation would mean that low wage countries we subjected to higher markups in product markets than higher wage countries.
De…nition 2. Conditional price convergence. International prices are said to obey conditional convergence if, in the absence of disturbances that alter markups and input prices over time, the distribution of real exchange rates F (q j it ) converges asymptotically to the nondegenerate distribution G(q j i ) where the distribution G(q j i ) is determined by the steady-state distribution of markups, wages and trade costs across countries. The mapping between the geographic distribution of input prices and retail prices is determined, element-by-element, from q
Much of the empirical literature on PPP and the Law-of-One-Price focuses on the trade costs as embodied in the last term of (2.5) . Using a more extensive cross-section of goods than we study here, Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2001) document show that -consistent with the formulation above -market structure, tradeability and the share of non-traded inputs into production are quantitatively important features of geographic price dispersion across European cities. Similar evidence for the U.S. via-a-vis Brazil may be found in Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2001) . Our notion of conditional convergence is meant to capture these features of the price distribution.
Our empirical analysis will also contrast the behavior of relative prices across cities within the United States. The theory outlined above is applicable to both intranational and international contexts, but the quantitative implications are likely to be quite di¤erent. For example, we would expect wage dispersion to be lower across regions within a country compared to that observed internationally. The relative importance of transportation costs across and within countries is not so obvious -overland transportation costs tend to be higher than overseas transportation costs for many goods. Another feature that distinguishes intranational and international markets is that the nominal exchange rate is irrevocably …xed in the former case but often ‡uctuates dramatically in the latter case. Unless nominal prices adjust instantaneously to changes in the nominal exchange rate we should expect micro-real exchange rates to change when the nominal exchange rate changes. Moreover, if wages adjust more slowly to currency ‡uctuations than do traded goods prices we would expect retail prices with larger wage costs to exhibit a higher degree of comovement with the nominal exchange rate.
Implications
Since the retail price is a log-linear combination of the markup, wage rate and traded intermediate good's prices, the dynamics of the retail price is a function of the dynamic properties of these variables. In our empirical work we restrict ourselves to …rst-order autoregressive (AR (1)) processes:
The individual e¤ect,´j i , is speci…c to the location and the good and non-zero values of these parameters is what distinguishes conditional from absolute convergence. In terms of the parameters of our retail model the individual e¤ect and long run mean of a good-speci…c real exchange rate are related in the following way:
In words: the long-run price of good j in location i relative to the mean (across countries or cities within a country) is equal to the relative markup plus production-shared weighted averages of the relative wage and traded intermediate prices.
The theory has a number of testable implications and parameters of interest. Among the testable restrictions are the stationarity of good-by-good real exchange rates and the absence or the presence of the individual e¤ects. Stationarity is perhaps the weakest restriction theoretically, requiring bounds on absolute di¤erences in markups, wages and traded good prices. It is natural to think of traded good prices as bounded by transportation costs and tari¤s while the entry and exit of …rms would bound the magnitude of markups across locations. Stationarity of the relative wage may be more problematic, at least in an international context since the costs of migration are formidable. However, for countries will similar factor endowments and technology the wage levels might be expected to be quite similar. Across cities within a country we would expect all of the determinants of retail prices to be less geographically variable, with perhaps the greatest di¤erence being in wages where factor mobility reduces the disparities substantially.
With both the theoretical and statistical model as a background it is productive to step back and think about the implications of our model for geographic price dispersion. At any point in time the di¤erences in prices across locations will re ‡ect the combined in ‡uence of long run di¤erences in relative prices in the steady-state, the persistence of movements in prices along the transition path, and the magnitude of the disturbances themselves. The principle advantage of having time series and cross-sectional data on absolute prices is that we are able to incorporate all three of these properties in our estimation technique. Thus we will be able to provide an estimate of how much of the dispersion we see in prices at a point in time is due to stochastic elements (such as business cycle variation and nominal exchange rate variation) and how much is the result of di¤erent long run prices across locations.
Data
Measuring Law-of-One-Price Deviations
The price data is collected by the Economist Intelligence Unit in its annual international price survey. The survey spans 301 individual retail goods and services across 122 cities located in 78 countries. The greater number of cities than countries re ‡ects the fact that in some countries price data is gathered for more than one city. We conduct our international analysis using one city from each country (though which city we choose varies somewhat across goods) while for our intranational analysis, we use cities within the continental U.S. We chose the U.S. for the simple reason that it has by far the largest number of cities surveyed at 13, compared to the next largest number of cities surveyed which equals 5 in Australia, China and Germany. The sample period begins in 1990 and ends in 2000.
The raw data are in domestic currency units so we begin by converting all of the prices from domestic currency into U.S. dollars at the average exchange rate prevailing for the year the price observation is recorded. Next, we compute the deviation of the price of each good from its average across all locations to place all prices on a common scale. Moreover, this normalization avoids problems inherent in choosing an arbitrary numeraire location.
For example, suppose the U.S. dollar price of good j in city i is P j it : Let the number of available cities for good j be N , then the relative price (in logs) q j it is the price of good j in U.S. dollars in city i relative to global mean of that good, p j t , at time t. Namely,
which is exactly the same de…nition of a real exchange rate for good j in location i at period t, applied in the theoretical section.
Since the raw data contain a number of missing observations and we want to work with balanced panels, we select goods and locations in the following way. First, when the exchange rate for a particular city is not available the city is removed from all panels. Second, for each good, cities that contain missing observations are removed.
In our estimation we pool our data across locations and time but estimate a separate regression for each good. The number of cities we use ranges from 23 to 69 and averages 58 in the international context; it ranges from 10 to 13 and averages 13 in the intranational context. In selecting the city to use in our international analysis we rely on the …rst city alphabetically from each country and add cities when necessary to achieve a balanced panel for a particular good. Table 1 presents the cities used in our study ordered by region and then alphabetically by country. The regions are Africa, Asia, Central America, Europe, North America, Oceania and South America. The 13 U.S. cities used in the analysis are also reported in Table 1 .
The number of goods for which a particular city is used in the estimation is noted in parentheses. Note that in most cases the city coming …rst in the alphabet is used for almost all of the analysis. For example, Germany is used as a location in all of the 270 (goods) panels that we estimate, but due to missing observations we use Berlin as the German city for 265 of those goods and Dusseldorf for the remaining 5 goods. Table 2 presents the breakdown of our sample of goods by our own classi…cation in terms of major consumption categories. The span of goods and services appears broadly representative of items found in a typical Consumer Price Index (the U.S. CPI for example) with the number of price observations by major consumption category varying considerably from a high of 112 (food and beverages) to a low of 3 (domestic help and salaries). Figure 1 plots the distribution of Law-of-One-Price deviations (q j it ) pooling all goods and locations. The …gure presents lines for the distribution of prices within the United States and across international cities for 3 of the 10 years available (1990, 1995 and 2000) . The densities are centered at zero, by construction and estimated using a Gaussian kernel. If the Law-of-One-Price held for all goods and across all locations, the densities would be degenerate at zero. Obviously there are signi…cant deviations from the Law-of-One-Price even though many goods come close (e.g. within 10% of the prediction). Particularly striking are the di¤erences in the international and intranational distributions. The dispersion of prices across cities in the U.S. is signi…cant but much lower than what we observe internationally; in 1990 the respective standard deviations are 0.281 and 0.685. The standard deviation is quite stable over time as is evident in comparing the densities across the …ve year intervals.
Price Dispersion
The price dispersion in Figure 1 could be entirely due to di¤erences in price levels across cities, common to all goods. For example, the cities in the richest countries might be located in the right-hand tail of the distribution while the cities in the poorer countries might be located in the left-hand tail of the distribution and all the price deviations are due to these city-e¤ects. To avoid presenting two dimensions to price dispersion in a one-dimensional …gure we average the good-by-good real exchange rates to obtain something like a PPP level by city. Figure 2 plots the distribution of q it = 1 M P M j=1 q j it within and across countries for 1990, 1995 and 2000. If prices were on average equal across cities, these densities would be degenerate at zero. Obviously this is not the case; it is also clear that price levels vary much more across countries than they do across U.S. cities.
Alternatively, the dispersion in prices could be entirely due to di¤erences in Law-of-OnePrice deviations across goods. For example, traded goods may come close to satisfying the Law-of-One-Price prediction and therefore tend to cluster around the point 0 whereas nontraded goods have larger deviations and are to be found in the tails of the distribution. Figure 3 shows that Law-of-One-Price deviations are larger for non-traded goods than for traded goods in both international and intranational distribution. Comparing Figures 2 and 3, city e¤ects appear more important than the traded/non-traded classi…cation.
One explanation for the di¤erences we observe in international and intranational price dispersion is that nominal exchange rate ‡uctuations move real exchange rates across time and since the U.S. is a common currency area, dispersion in price levels across cities (and goods) is lower. Another explanation is that arbitrage costs prevent the Law-of-One-Price from holding across locations and these costs are higher internationally than intranationally. One of the main goals of the paper is to examine the cross-sectional time series behavior of micro-real exchange rates to see if these alternative views can be supported.
In particular we hope to determine the relative importance of permanent deviations from the Law-of-One-Price and stochastic ‡uctuations around those long run levels for the shape of the price densities both within and across countries. At one extreme, real exchange rates may be constant over time but the Law-of-One-Price is grossly violated; thus the long run and period-by-period densities are one in the same. At another extreme, the long run density is degenerate, satisfying the Law-of-One-Price restriction for all goods, locations and time periods. In this case, price distribution is entirely driven by temporary ‡uctuations around a degenerate long run distribution.
The Empirical Results
Unit Root Tests
We begin our formal statistical work by conducting unit root tests for each good in our cross-section since the economic interpretation of the sample means are not very useful if real exchange rates are not stationary. With at most 11 time series observations for the real exchange rate of a given city, conventional panel unit root tests are not applicable. Instead, we pool all cities for each good and employ a panel unit root test with …xed time dimension as developed by Richard D.F. Harris and Elias Tzavalis (1999) . They considered the following three di¤erent models:
Model with no constant:
q it = ¹ i + ½q t¡1 + v it Model with constant and trend: q it = ¹ i +¯it + ½q t¡1 + v it where q it is the real exchange rate for a particular good in location i at date t. We suppress the good index since this will be the basic unit of study in what follows. Corresponding unit root test statistics for the null hypothesis of ½ = 1 are C
, respectively, where b ½ P OOL is the least squares pooled estimator, b ½ LSDV is the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator, b ½ LSDV T is the least squares dummy variable with trend estimator. 2 As N grows, each statistic has been shown to follow a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis of a unit root. In the context of our analysis, the …rst test can be viewed as a test of no convergence against the alternative of absolute convergence while the second and third tests can be viewed as a test of no convergence against the alternative of conditional convergence. Table 3 summarizes the results of unit root tests. In the international data we are able to reject the null of a unit root is almost every case. Rejection rates range from 91% when we include a constant and time trend and test at the 1% level of signi…cance to 100% when we include a constant but no time trend. The intranational evidence is not as overwhelming in the rejection rates. However, fewer rejections for intranational data compared to international evidence can be simply explained by the lack of power due to small sample size. In addition, even in the case with a constant and time trend (which we expect to have lowest power), we reject a unit root for more than one half of the goods
in our sample (55%). Overall, these results are more favorable to the proposition of long run price convergence than much of the existing literature, though not so di¤erent when compared to results that utilize panels. The fact that we are using micro-data on goods that are comparable across locations as well as the fact that we normalize to the cross-sectional mean are likely to be additional important factors that distinguish our results from those in existing work. This evidence is reassuring from a theoretical perspective since stationarity is a weak property for international prices to satisfy, a much stronger condition is that the Law-of-One-Price holds exactly in every time period, an issue to which we now turn. Table 4 reports the mean real exchange rate (average across goods) for beginning and ending points of our sample period, 1990 and 2000. Given our normalization the means are zero when we present statistics across all international cities or all intranational (U.S.) cities. Our focus is on the conditional means by region, income level and the type of good. At the regional level, we …nd a tendency for PPP deviations to fall between 1990 and 2000. Price levels, as we de…ne them, range from 21% below the world average in Africa to 9% above the world average in North America in 2000. The variation is somewhat greater in 1990 with the Central/South America region having an average price level 33% below the world average and Europe being 21% above the average.
Mean Real Exchange Rates
One limitation of using regional aggregates such as these is that within most regions there are wide income disparities; which in light of the pioneering work of Irving B. Kravis and Robert E. Lipsey (1983) suggests that we may be averaging out a great deal of the cross-country variation. The lower panel of the table breaks the regions into high and lowto-middle income regions to address this issue. 3 The variation in PPP is now obvious. For example, while Asia as a whole is close to the world mean, the high income countries within that region have, on average, price levels 31% above the world mean while the low-to-middle income countries in Asia have price levels averaging 26% below the world mean. Europe, the only other region with countries falling into both income groupings has a price level for the high income region 41% above the world mean while the low income region has a price level 27% below the world mean. Thus, conditioning on income levels is a key element in international price dispersion, at least in terms of the average good. or divergence. Using the means that condition on income levels, 3 groups are diverging from the mean while 5 are converging toward the mean; in terms of the country-level data the divergent group involves 25 countries while the convergent group involves 65 countries which is a bit more favorable to the price level convergence hypothesis.
The last four columns of Table 4 look at the same measures but using only traded or non-traded goods in the computations. We would expect non-traded goods to exhibit larger deviations from the Law-of-One-Price than traded goods. We …nd strong evidence of this: 28 of the 32 measures have larger absolute values for non-traded goods than traded goods. One would not want to interpret the quantitative importance of the deviations using these numbers because the price di¤erence tend to average out across goods. However, the ranking would hold up so long as this tendency was no more severe in traded goods than non-traded goods. To get a clearer sense of dispersion we compute standard deviations of prices across goods and locations within each of the bins of Table 4 . Table 5 reports these …ndings and includes the U.S. for comparison purposes (the U.S. was not included in Table 4 for the simple reason that the means are zero, by construction). Looking at the geographic dispersion in micro-real exchange rates pooling across all goods we see that the di¤erences are not particularly great across regions or when comparing 1990 to 2000. We do see some tendency for price dispersion to be lower across high income countries than across low income countries. For example, the standard deviation of real exchange rates averages 0.452 for high-income European countries compared to 0.617 for low-or middle-income European countries (in 2000).
More obvious and perhaps more interesting are the di¤erences when we condition on tradeability. Pooling all international regions and goods the standard deviation of real exchange rates is 0.626 for traded goods and 0.855 for non-traded goods (in 1990). Thus we see larger deviations from the Law-of-One-Price for non-traded goods as we would expect. Two numbers that stand out in Table 5 relate to the high income European group where dispersion in traded goods drops from 0.367 in 1990 to 0.107 in 2000. Presumably this has to do with policies promoting European Union economic integration.
Traded good price dispersion is lower than non-traded good price dispersion in both in the international and intranational data as one would expect, but the dispersion of prices in the U.S. is strictly less than that observed internationally even controlling for the type of good under consideration. The dispersion prices across locations (within the U.S.) for non-traded goods is 0.344 in 1990 signi…cantly lower even than the dispersion of traded goods prices internationally which has a dispersion of 0.626.
The ratio of variance is between 5 and 6 when moving from intranational price dispersion to international price dispersion. In other words, if we take the variance of traded goods prices in the year 2000 for both the U.S. and average internationally, the geographic variance of prices within the U.S. was about 5.5% while that observed internationally was 27.8%. To place these numbers in perspective, if each city specialized in the production of a particular good and trade took place across all locations, these variances would be consistent with transportation costs of 5.5% and 27.8%, respectively. For non-traded goods the corresponding numbers would be 10% and 60%, which seems to indicate that we would have to go beyond transport costs and recognize the role of non-traded inputs and other factors that contribute to price dispersion to account for the international data.
Recall that our retail pricing model predicts that greater wage dispersion across locations would give rise to greater retail price dispersion across locations, but with the e¤ect magni…ed for retail goods which used larger shares of non-traded inputs (such as labor). The broad features of the dispersion measures in Table 5 are consistent with this prediction.
Real Exchange Rate Dynamics
Based on the unit root tests, we found the evidence against nonstationarity of Law-of-OnePrice deviations. This implies the possibility of either absolute or conditional convergence of the price deviations. To compare the two classes of price convergence, we consider the estimation of AR (1) models with and without good-speci…c city e¤ects. All the models are estimated for each good separately. If the Law-of-One-Price holds in the long-run for each good then absolute convergence is said to prevail and we consider the following speci…cation:
To estimate this model, we employ the least squares pooled estimator (b ½ P OOL ) where it is understood that pooling is across locations which are indexed by i and not goods (Goods are indexed by j therefore we again drop the superscript for goods). Alternatively, long run LOP may fail to hold for each good, then conditional convergence is said to occur and the following AR(1) model with unobserved individual-speci…c e¤ects is appropriate:
q it = ½q i;t¡1 +´i + v it (4.2) for i = 1; :::; N and t = 2; :::; T , and j½j < 1. We assume that individual e¤ect´i and the time-varying error v it are independently distributed across i and E(´i) = 0; E(v it ) = 0; and E(v it´i ) = 0 for i = 1; :::; N and t = 2; :::; T:
We allow heterosckedasticity of v it , but exclude the possibility of serial correlation E(v it v is ) = 0 for i = 1; :::; N and for all t 6 = s:
For the initial conditions q i1 , we assume E(q i1 v it ) = 0 for i = 1; :::; N and t = 2; :::; T:
One way of estimating this model is to use the LSDV estimator b ½ LSDV which is known to be consistent with large T . However, with the short time span of our data, the presence of bias in this estimator should be taken into consideration when interpreting the results. To avoid this inconsistency issue, it is common practice to use the GMM estimator (b ½ GMM ) based on the …rst di¤erence transformation, q it ¡ q i;t¡1 = ½ (q i;t¡1 ¡ q i;t¡2 ) + (v it ¡ v i;t¡1 ) for t = 3; :::; T; with instruments selected from the orthogonality condition, E [q is (v it ¡ v i;t¡1 )] = 0 for s = 1; :::; t ¡ 2 and t = 3; :::; T:
Despite the theoretical superiority, simulation results sometimes show inaccuracy of the …rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator (see Jan F. Kiviet, 1995 for example). On balance, we report both LSDV and GMM estimates of the autoregressive parameter ½, but we leave the bias issue in LSDV estimator to the discussion section.
The estimated persistence parameters for both (4.1) and (4.2) based on least squares method are reported in Table 6 . Beginning with the international estimates we see that the average autoregressive coe¢cient estimate under the absolute convergence hypothesis (or b ½ P OOL ) is equal to 0.88, indicating substantial persistence in real exchange rates; similar to what is found in the literature using aggregate price indices. The standard errors are small and the con…dence intervals have upper-bounds typically below unity, consistent with our prior rejection of unit roots. The persistence parameters range from a low of 0.73 to a high of 0.99, across individual goods.
Turning to the estimates that allow for city-e¤ects (or b ½ LSDV ), the results are quite di¤er-ent. Now the average autoregressive coe¢cient is 0.43 with individual estimates ranging from 0.15 to 0.86. The standard errors are on average twice that of the pooled estimates, but the estimates under absolute and conditional convergence are statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from one another. This point can be seen more in detail in Figure 4A which shows empirical distribution of b ½ P OOL and b ½ LSDV with their two standard error bands. Obviously, the two estimates are economically distinct with the half-lives under absolute convergence averaging 5.4 years compared to a mere 10 months under the conditional convergence speci…cation.
Contrary to our expectations, the persistence of Law-of-One-Price deviations across U.S. cities are comparable to what we …nd internationally. The autoregressive coe¢cients average 0.81 based on absolute price convergence estimates (b ½ P OOL ) and 0.53 based on conditional price convergence estimates (b ½ LSDV ). Empirical distribution of both estimates with error bands for intranational case are shown in Figure 4B . The range of parameter estimates is 0.39 to 1.0 for b ½ P OOL and 0.05 to 0.91 for b ½ LSDV ; standard errors for both speci…cations are larger than what we …nd in the international case, likely due to the smaller number of cities available in the U.S. panels compared to the international panels. The half lives for deviations from the Law-of-One-Price across U.S. cities are 3.3 years under absolute convergence compared to 13 months under conditional convergence.
To investigate the plausibility of two alternative speci…cations, we conduct the F test for the joint signi…cance of the dummy variables used for b ½ LSDV . Such a test can be viewed as a test for the null of absolute convergence against the alternative of conditional convergence. The results for the F test are also reported in Table 6 . The no individual e¤ect hypothesis is signi…cantly rejected for most international micro-prices di¤erences, but not rejected for about half of the goods for intranational case.. This result suggests that the data is consistent with the conditional convergence hypothesis along with the theory of retail price at least for international case.
The econometric explanation for the di¤erences in the persistence estimates under absolute and conditional convergence is straight-forward. Figure 5 sketches representative regression lines, location-by-location for a particular good with and without city-e¤ects. The thin ‡at lines are what one estimates under conditional convergence, where a constant term in each regression relationship allows each good to converge to a unique, city-speci…c, mean. The bold line is what is estimated under the assumption of absolute convergence, which …ts a single regression line to the entire panel of observations for a particular good. Stationarity of the individual real exchange rates about their location-speci…c means ensures that most sample points lie close to the 45 ± line so the slope parameter (persistence) is biased upward under absolute convergence. This argument implies that in forcing goods to satisfy the Law-of-One-Price in the long run when the sample means are far from that prediction and persistence at the micro-level is low, a severe upward bias in persistence of the deviations results. Table 7 reports analogous results for absolute and conditional convergence based on the GMM estimator. In addition to the …rst-di¤erenced GMM estimates (b ½ GM M ) under the conditional convergence speci…cation, we also report the GMM estimates (b ½ ¤ GM M ) under the absolute convergence which is the GMM counterpart of b ½ P OOL . For both b ½ ¤ GM M and b ½ GM M , the numbers are generally very close to what we get using the least squares method. One key di¤erence, though, is the lower average persistence measure in the intranational (U.S.) estimates under the conditional convergence speci…cation. The consequence of this lower estimate is that the average persistence in the international and intranational data under conditional convergence is now statistically indistinguishable. Recall, that using the LSDV estimator (b ½ LSDV ) it appeared that under conditional convergence, the U.S. deviations were actually more persistent than the international deviations. Thus in checking the robustness of our results using an alternative estimator we discount the potentially counter intuitive result that Law-of-One-Price deviations are less persistent internationally than intranationally. However, the issue of …nite sample bias remains and we leave it to the next section to determine if we might be more de…nitive on the ranking of international and intranational price persistence. Similar to the least square case, we can conduct the test of no individual e¤ects with GMM estimator as a test for the absolute price convergence against the conditional price convergence. The results for this test are also reported in Table 7 . Just like the least squares case, the absolute convergence hypothesis is signi…cantly rejected with international data. However, for all the case, we could not reject the same null hypothesis with intranational data with any conventional signi…cance level.
The picture of relative price adjustment that emerges from our analysis of micro-data is that price adjustment is very rapid both across cities within countries and across cities of the world. In terms of persistence of Law-of-One-Price deviations, national borders appear not to matter. What national borders do matter for are the magnitudes of the long run deviations from the Law-of-One-Price. Across U.S. cities the deviations are economically small while across international cities the deviations are economically large. As a consequence, much of the dispersion we observe in Figures 1 and 2 is not the result of stochastic ‡uctuations in relative prices over time but rather re ‡ects permanent (at least as permanent as our sample length of 10 years will allow us to estimate) deviations from the Law-of-One-Price.
Discussion
Aggregation
We estimate city price levels using average of log-prices: P it´1 M P M j=1 P j it and recalling that all prices were already in U.S. dollar, we construct aggregate real exchange rate in the standard way: q it´Pit ¡ P t (standard except that we use the average price level in the world as the numeraire price.
Note that if the persistence parameters are the same across goods, then the aggregate real exchange rate will have the same persistence as the micro-real exchange rates. To determine if this is the case, we estimate the following regressions:
where the bars over the variables indicate averages across goods, location-by-location. Estimating this speci…cation for the aggregated real exchange rate we get parameter estimates of 0.89 and 0.34 for the international data under absolute and conditional convergence, respectively. Recall the averages of the analogous estimates at the micro-level were 0.88 and 0.43, respectively. Thus it appears that the our persistence results are preserved under this form of aggregation and by implication that the high persistence obtained elsewhere in the literature using CPI data appears not to be a consequence of simple aggregation bias. 
Weighting Method
Another possible explanation for the persistence of deviations found in aggregate studies is that consumption weights di¤er across countries i and k. Consider two goods and two locations and suppose that the price indices are:
where lower case variables refer to logarithms. Now suppose prices actually obey the law of one price exactly so that p j it = p j kt 8i, then we have:
The implication is that unless the price of good 1 relative to good 2 is constant over time, national price indices will diverge from the PPP prediction even when the Law-of-OnePrice holds exactly. Given that relative price levels are quite di¤erent across countries the expenditure shares might be expected to be di¤erent. Thus movements in the price of one good relative to another that is common to all countries (e.g. computer prices relative to oil prices) would move price indices by di¤erent amounts across countries due to di¤erent consumption weighting schemes. Given that these relative price movements are likely to be persistent, considerable autocorrelation might result.
Turning the argument on its head, we know that the goods included in the CPI are di¤erent in each country. Even if the consumption weights on various categories such as food, consumption and shelter were identical across countries the 'goods' in these bundles are often very di¤erent and the above argument goes through.
Bias
In the main section, we presented the results from LSDV and GMM estimation. For the LSDV estimator with …xed T , Nickell (1981) derived a formula for the asymptotic bias when N tends to in…nity. The bias formula is given by,
Therefore, the inconsistency with …xed T results from the asymptotic bias of order O(T ¡1 ) which is always negative given 0 < ½ < 1. In contrast, the GMM estimator does not su¤er from this type of asymptotic bias (and is therefore consistent) while the …nite sample bias due to a …xed N may still be present. The bias formula has an approximation error of O(N ¡1 T ¡3=2 ) and when the bias is corrected, the LSDV estimator is consistent not just for large T but also for …nite T with large N . Kiviet (1995) suggests correcting the LSDV estimators with a consistent bias estimation method. Following Kiviet, we report the bias corrected LSDV estimator where the bias of original LSDV estimator b ½ LSDV is evaluated using a consistent estimator of persistence, namely the GMM estimator b ½ GM M . Unlike Kiviet's case, it should be noted that this bias formula does not require the estimation of error variance since we do not have exogenous variables in the autoregressive model. Table 8 reports the results of bias adjustment along with the original LSDV and GMM estimates. The bias corrected persistence parameter averages 0.58 in the international data, compared to 0.68 for the intranational data. While the bias correction for the mean of the estimated parameters is about 0.10 in both cases, the fact that the LSDV estimates start out at a higher level implies that the bias-corrected estimated remain higher in the intranational data. In terms of estimated half-lives, the average for the international cities is 15 months compared to about 21 months across U.S. cities. While there may be a statistically signi…cant di¤erence here, the main implication of the paper -that conditional convergence is much faster than absolute convergence in both the international and intranational context -is …rmly upheld.
Figures 6A and 6B present detailed good-by-good persistence measures for the international and intranational panels. In both …gures, the x-axis measures the persistence estimated under absolute convergence while the y-axis measures the persistence parameters under conditional convergence. We see that in each case the good-by-good estimates are highly positively correlated -a regression line through the two scatters yields an almost identical slope of 1.1. Thus the di¤erences between international and intranational persistence is di¢cult to detect at the microeconomic level. The only substantive di¤erence across the two …gures is the center of the scatter-plots which represent the mean bias-adjusted LSDV persistence estimates which were already discussed in relation to Table 8 .
Conclusions and Implications for Future Work
Our results appear to go part way toward resolving the Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle in the following sense. Viewed from the perspective of our microeconomic evidence, the persistence of real exchange rates is an artifact of mis-speci…cation of the long run distribution of relative prices. When conditional convergence is assumed, persistence is low, easily within the range typically considered plausible for models with nominal rigidities.
The notion expressed by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (in describing the PPP puzzle) that real factors induce persistence but not large changes in relative prices was another piece of the puzzle. Taken literally, our results indicate the existence of large and permanent deviations from the Law-of-One-Price in the international data. If we interpret these permanent di¤er-ences as real factors -as many prominent theories, including the Balassa-Samuelson (1964) hypothesis would suggest -they are very important quantitatively. Moreover, the changes in relative prices over the business cycle due to real shocks would fall into the same category as the nominal shocks based on our empirical model. Ironically, real shocks may deliver too much persistence in the deviations! In studying micro-economic deviations from the Law-of-One-Price we do raise an important empirical puzzle; namely the inconsistency between the persistence of good-speci…c deviations and deviations as measured by the CPI. We have already noted that our evidence holds up under a simple aggregation scheme (an equally weighted average of individual real exchange rates) so the di¤erence between our …nding and that in the aggregate studies does not appear to be due to aggregation.
We plan to explore a number of issues in future work. First, we plan to investigate the robustness of our aggregation results to alternative weighting methodologies -expenditure weights versus equal weighting, for example. Second, we will consider the issue of using a numeraire in the analysis as opposed to our numeraire independent measure of the real exchange rate. David Papell (1997) has emphasized that much of the existing literature has used the U.S. dollar as the numeraire and the persistence of exchange rates may be a re ‡ection of movements in the bilateral dollar exchange rates and not necessarily movements in relative prices across other bilateral pairings. Last, we intend to conduct a more comprehensive review of the comparability of the baskets that are priced in the CPI. A major di¤erence between the types of data found in the EIU panel (as well as that studied by Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2001) ) is that the CPI is intended to maximize comparability of goods over time while the cross-sectional panels attempt to maximize comparability across locations. That these two methodologies lead to di¤erent empirical implications regarding real exchange rate behavior at the disaggregate and aggregate levels may turn out to be a function of the survey design. We believe that these avenues will help us to reconcile the microeconomic evidence on Law-of-One-Prices uncovered here with the broader literature that utilizes price indices.
Appendix
A.1. Data Source
The data are collected in the Worldwide Cost of Living Survey compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit. The intent of the survey is to provide human resource managers with data on which to base compensation decisions across countries. The survey covers 122 cities and 301 goods or services. Many goods prices are collected in di¤erent types of retail outlets. In our analysis we use only large-scale retail outlets to avoid have goods appear more than once in our analysis.
A.2. GMM Estimation
Under the assumptions in the main text, the …rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator of AR coe¢-cient ½ based on m = (T ¡ 1)(T ¡ 2)=2 total moment conditions can be written as N is an optimal weighting matrix. Following Arellano and Bond (1991) , we employ
for the …rst step estimator. For the second step estimation, we use
where b u i are residual vectors from the …rst step estimator. For the GMM estimation without individual (city) e¤ects, T ¡ 1 additional moment conditions are available since total of m ¤ = T (T ¡ 1)=2 moment conditions are implied by E [q is v it ] = 0 for s = 1; :::; t ¡ 1 and t = 2; :::; T:
The GMM estimator without individual e¤ects is given by (0) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Oceania (0) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: These real exchange rates use the world average price. Estimates under absolute convergence Estimates under conditional convergence
